The Supreme Court on Friday dismissed a writ petition filed by Congress leader Meenakshi Natarajan challenging the rejection of her nomination for the Rajya Sabha election from Madhya Pradesh, holding that the petition was not maintainable in view of the constitutional bar on judicial interference in election matters.
The Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice AS Chandurkar declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, observing that Article 329 expressly restricts judicial intervention in electoral disputes except through the mechanism prescribed by election law.
The Court rejected the contention that constitutional courts could intervene under Articles 32 or 226 in cases involving glaring or manifest errors in the rejection of nomination papers. It observed that accepting such a proposition would create an impermissible distinction between different categories of election disputes and effectively introduce an exception not contemplated under Article 329. The Bench held that any challenge to the rejection of a nomination must be pursued through an election petition before the appropriate forum.
However, the Court granted her liberty to challenge the rejection through an election petition under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1951.
While dismissing the plea, the Bench clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of Natarajan’s challenge and that all contentions would remain open for consideration in appropriate proceedings.
The controversy arose after Returning Officer Arvind Sharma rejected Natarajan’s nomination on June 9 on the grounds that she had failed to disclose in her Form 26 affidavit details of a private complaint pending before a court in Telangana, despite having received a summons in the matter.
Appearing for Natarajan, Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi argued that the rejection was legally unsustainable. He submitted that Section 33A of RPA required disclosure only of criminal cases in which charges have been framed by a competent court. According to him, no cognisance had been taken in the complaint against Natarajan, and therefore, there was no legal obligation to disclose it.
Singhvi informed the Court that the proceedings stemmed from a private complaint in Telangana in which Natarajan had been arrayed as a respondent. He argued that she had merely received a notice under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), a provision that requires a Magistrate to hear a proposed accused before taking cognisance of a private complaint. Since the matter remained at a pre-cognisance stage, he contended that no criminal case existed in the eyes of law.
The Bench, however, questioned the submission, with Justice Mishra observing that a court issues summons only after applying its mind to the matter. Singhvi reiterated that even assuming cognisance had been taken, the statutory requirement under Section 33A was disclosure only of cases where charges had been framed.
He further argued that the Returning Officer’s decision was arbitrary, irrational and contrary to law. According to Singhvi, the rejection deprived Natarajan of her right to contest the election and undermined the principle of a level playing field in the electoral process.
Explaining the background of the complaint, Singhvi submitted that it primarily related to allegations of molestation against another individual. Natarajan was allegedly named as the fourth respondent only on the accusation that she failed to take action against the principal accused in her capacity as the Congress party’s Telangana in-charge. He pointed out that the alleged incident occurred in 2022 whereas Natarajan was appointed Telangana in-charge only in 2025.
Singhvi also informed the Court that the Election Commission of India (ECI) had not taken any action on the complaint submitted by Natarajan against the rejection of her nomination. He noted that the apprehension expressed during the earlier hearing had materialised, as the rival candidate had already been declared elected unopposed after the rejection of her nomination.
To support the maintainability of the writ petition, Singhvi relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner. He argued that courts could intervene in exceptional situations where their intervention would facilitate rather than obstruct the electoral process. Drawing a parallel with observations made in that judgment, he contended that the Returning Officer’s decision had effectively prevented a meaningful election from taking place.
He also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar, and argued that judicial intervention aimed at correcting an illegal act that obstructs the electoral process does not amount to questioning an election.
The Bench, however, expressed concern that entertaining such writ petitions would create a dual system of adjudication. Justice Mishra observed that if courts were permitted to examine rejected nominations under Articles 32 and 226, some election disputes would be decided through constitutional remedies while others would continue to be dealt with through election petitions, contrary to the constitutional scheme.
Singhvi urged the Court not to allow procedural barriers to defeat substantive justice. He maintained that the case involved a manifest illegality and that Natarajan was merely seeking the right to contest an election rather than a declaration of victory.
Opposing the petition, Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi, appearing for the rival candidate, argued that the right to contest an election is a statutory right and not a fundamental right. Consequently, Article 32 could not be invoked. He submitted that Article 329 expressly bars judicial interference in election matters and that the proper remedy for challenging rejection of a nomination is an election petition.
Rohatgi relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, which held that disputes relating to improper acceptance or rejection of nomination papers must be raised only through election petitions after the election process is completed.
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh, also participated in the proceedings. He clarified that the State sought to intervene in the matter and was not representing the rival candidate.
Advocate Kanu Agarwal, appearing for the rival candidate during a temporary disconnection in Rohatgi’s virtual appearance, submitted that the Representation of the People Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on election tribunals to adjudicate election disputes. He emphasised the overriding language used in Article 329 and argued that the constitutional bar excludes recourse to Articles 32 and 226.
Senior Advocate Dama Seshadri Naidu, appearing for the Election Commission of India, similarly argued that the statutory framework vests exclusive jurisdiction in election tribunals to examine challenges relating to elections. He submitted that once such jurisdiction is conferred by law, neither the Election Commission nor the constitutional courts can intervene in the middle of the election process. Naidu also defended the declaration of the rival candidate as elected unopposed, stating that the Representation of the People Act mandates such a declaration when no valid opposing candidature remains.
During the hearing, Rohatgi additionally argued that changes introduced after 2018 require candidates to disclose all pending criminal cases and that Form 26 specifically mandates such disclosure. Singhvi countered this submission by asserting that the disclosure requirements in Form 26 cannot override the statutory framework contained in Section 33A of the Representation of the People Act.
After considering the rival submissions, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable and held that any challenge to the rejection of Natarajan’s nomination must be pursued through an election petition in accordance with the statutory election dispute resolution mechanism. The Court made it clear that all questions on the legality of the Returning Officer’s decision remain open for determination in such proceedings.
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