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Adultery And Moral Turpitude

21/11/2026BlogNo Comments

By Sujit Bhar

The law has a curious way of drawing distinctions that often appear contradictory to the ordinary citizen. An act that is no longer a criminal offence can nevertheless invite disciplinary action in government service. Conduct that was once regarded as immoral may no longer justify punishment, but that does not necessarily mean that every consequence arising from it disappears. The distinction between the two is particularly important when it comes to adultery, and a recent Madras High Court judgment has brought this issue into sharp focus.

A division bench of Justices G Jayachandran and E Manoharan of the High Court, while modifying the punishment imposed on a government nurse who had a child with a married man, made an observation that deserves considerable attention. The Court said that conduct which was once considered legally or morally unacceptable and carried a social stigma has undergone a change in perception. In recent times, such conduct has either been decriminalised or its punishment has come to be regarded as moral policing.

The observation is significant because the bench simultaneously upheld the disciplinary finding against the nurse under the Tamil Nadu Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1973. It modified her punishment from dismissal to removal from service, leaving the state government free to consider a fresh appointment or reinstatement without past service benefits, subject to eligibility. The suggestion, however, was not a binding direction.

Here lies the apparent contradiction. How can conduct attract disciplinary action when the Supreme Court has already decriminalised adultery? And when does enforcing service discipline become an exercise in moral policing?

To understand this, it is necessary to revisit a landmark constitutional judgment.

WHAT JOSEPH SHINE ACTUALLY CHANGED

On September 27, 2018, a five-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous verdict in Joseph Shine vs Union of India, fundamentally changing the legal position on adultery in India.

The Court struck down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as it related to prosecution for adultery. The provisions were declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.

Section 497 had effectively criminalised sexual relations between a man and a married woman without the consent or connivance of her husband. The woman was not punishable, while the husband was treated as the aggrieved party. The provision was rooted in an outdated understanding of marriage, treating a wife almost as the property of her husband.

The Supreme Court found this arrangement discriminatory and constitutionally untenable. It violated Article 14 by creating an arbitrary distinction between men and women, Article 15 by perpetuating discrimination based on sex, and Article 21 by interfering with individual dignity, privacy and sexual autonomy.

The judgment recognised that two consenting adults must have the freedom to make personal choices without the State automatically converting those choices into criminal offences.

Consequently, adultery ceased to be a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment. It is important, however, not to confuse decriminalisation with legal approval. Adultery continues to be a civil wrong and remains a recognised ground for divorce or judicial separation under applicable matrimonial laws.

The Supreme Court did not abolish the institution of marriage, nor did it remove the legal consequences of violating marital commitments. It simply held that criminal prosecution was not an appropriate instrument for regulating the intimate relationships of consenting adults.

WHY GOVERNMENT SERVICE RULES SURVIVE

The distinction becomes clearer when criminal liability is separated from departmental discipline.

Criminal law determines whether an individual has committed an offence punishable by the State. Departmental service rules, on the other hand, prescribe the standards of conduct expected from people entrusted with public responsibilities.

A government employee is not merely an individual drawing a salary. The employee represents an institution financed by public money and is expected to maintain standards of integrity, responsibility and conduct that sustain public confidence.

The Tamil Nadu Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1973 (the rules in question in this particular case), contain specific provisions dealing with this responsibility.

Rule 19(1) prohibits bigamous marriages, subject to specified exceptions. More importantly, Rule 19(2) provides that no government servant shall involve himself or herself in an act involving moral turpitude, including an unlawful act that may cause embarrassment or bring discredit to the government.

Rule 20 separately requires government servants to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and to refrain from conduct unbecoming of a member of the service.

These provisions do not depend entirely on whether an act is classified as a criminal offence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita or the earlier Indian Penal Code. Their purpose is to regulate professional and institutional standards.

Therefore, an act can escape criminal prosecution and still be examined under applicable service regulations. The two proceedings have different objectives, different legal foundations and different standards of assessment.

This is not peculiar to Tamil Nadu. Government service regulations across India contain provisions requiring employees to maintain integrity and avoid conduct unbecoming of public servants.

THE SUPREME COURT’S CLARIFICATION ON THE ARMED FORCES

The distinction was further examined by the Supreme Court in January 2023, when it considered the Union government’s request for clarification of the Joseph Shine judgment in relation to the armed forces.

The government argued that the Army Act, the Air Force Act and the Navy Act contain independent provisions dealing with unbecoming conduct and violations of discipline. It wanted clarity on whether these provisions could continue to operate despite adultery having been decriminalised.

The Supreme Court clarified that Joseph Shine had not examined the operation of these special statutory provisions. It had neither invalidated them nor pronounced on their effect.

The Court also made it clear that decriminalisation did not amount to judicial approval of adultery. It recognised that adultery could remain a moral wrong, a civil wrong and a ground for dissolution of marriage.

This clarification, however, was specifically concerned with the statutory framework governing the armed forces, which also enjoys a distinct constitutional position under Article 33. It should not be interpreted as a blanket Supreme Court authorisation for government departments to punish every instance of adultery.

Nevertheless, the underlying distinction is important: striking down a criminal provision does not automatically invalidate an independent disciplinary provision that operates for a different purpose.

THE THIN LINE BETWEEN DISCIPLINE AND MORALITY

The recent Madras High Court case, A Nithyakalyani vs The Principal Secretary to Government, decided on November 12, 2026, demonstrates how complicated this distinction can become.

The nurse had joined government service on a contractual basis in 2007, and her services were regularised in 2009. Disciplinary proceedings followed a complaint by the wife of a man with whom the nurse had a relationship and a child.

The nurse disputed the allegation of a bigamous marriage and argued that her personal relationship could not automatically be treated as misconduct. She also pointed out that the criminal proceedings had ended in acquittal following a compromise between the parties.

The criminal case had initially resulted in her conviction for abetting bigamy under Section 494 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. She was sentenced to two years’ rigorous imprisonment. During the appeal, however, the complainant agreed to a settlement involving Rs 10 lakh, and the offence was compounded with the appellate court’s permission.

The High Court refused to treat this acquittal as sufficient to erase the departmental finding. It held that the criminal proceedings had ended through compounding and that this did not automatically wipe out the conduct established in the disciplinary enquiry.

The bench consequently upheld the finding under Rule 19(2).

However, it was not prepared to allow the original punishment to stand without considering changing social attitudes. It modified dismissal to removal from service and suggested that the authorities could consider a fresh appointment or reinstatement without past service benefits.

The High Court’s observation about moral policing is particularly important here. It acknowledged that society’s understanding of marital relationships and childbirth has changed. What was once regarded as socially unacceptable cannot automatically continue to attract the harshest institutional punishment merely because conventional morality demands it.

WHERE MORAL POLICING MUST STOP

This is where the judgment raises a question that government departments across the country must confront.

If service rules are allowed to become instruments for judging the private lives of employees, the constitutional protection recognised in Joseph Shine could gradually lose its meaning. A department cannot simply declare an employee morally unfit because the employee’s personal choices do not conform to prevailing social expectations.

There must be a demonstrable connection between the alleged conduct and the legitimate requirements of public service. The department must establish the relevant facts through a fair enquiry, apply the appropriate rule and impose a proportionate punishment.

The mere existence of a relationship outside marriage cannot, without more, become an automatic licence for dismissal. Nor can the birth of a child outside marriage, by itself, be treated as proof of moral turpitude. The circumstances, the precise misconduct alleged and the applicable statutory provisions must all be examined.

The disciplinary authority must also distinguish between actual misconduct and public embarrassment arising merely because somebody has complained. Public disapproval is not necessarily evidence of institutional discredit.

The judiciary, therefore, has an important responsibility in ensuring that broad expressions such as moral turpitude and conduct unbecoming of a government servant are not applied arbitrarily. Their application must be consistent with constitutional values, equality, privacy, dignity and proportionality.

The post Adultery And Moral Turpitude appeared first on India Legal.

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